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Abstract
This study provides evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that manager-
ial bonuses can aﬀect adversely a manager’s subordinates. In our set up, managers
compete to obtain a large bonus which depends partly on the eﬀort exerted by their
subordinates. Managers can suggest an eﬀort level and coerce subordinates who dis-
obey by punishing them. When managers compete for individual bonuses, we find
that subordinates do not obey their demands. This doubles coercion rates relative to
a control treatment without bonuses. In contrast, when managers compete for pooled
bonuses which give managers discretionary power over the allocation of the bonus, most
subordinates exert maximal eﬀort. Although managers share a substantial fraction of
the bonus, they are not worse oﬀ than they are with an individual bonus. A model
in which agents care about inequality in earnings can account for the main findings in
our experiment.
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1 Introduction
Managerial performance bonuses are used widely in modern organizations (Hall and Lieb-
man 1998; Hall and Murphy 2003; Oyer and Schaefer 2004) and often form a significant
part of a manager’s pay package (Lazear and Shaw, 2007).1 Empirical work to date has
mainly focused on the impact of managerial incentives on firm productivity (Chevalier
and Ellison 1997; Groves et al. 1994; Oyer, 1998). There is little evidence however on
how managerial bonuses impact on the welfare of the managers’ subordinates. This is an
interesting question as, by nature, a manager’s performance (and hence bonus) depends
largely on the performance of their subordinates. The answer, therefore, may have impor-
tant consequences for the optimal design of compensation schemes. As Lazear and Shaw
(2007, p.6) write: “Very large pay spreads induce high eﬀort, but they also create a work
environment in the firm that is not very pleasant.”
High-powered incentives have been known to have potentially adverse eﬀects on other
competitors, i.e., employees at the same level in the hierarchy, by increasing the incidence
of sabotage (e.g., Lazear, 1989) and undermining cooperation between co-workers (e.g.,
Drago and Turnbull, 1991). In this paper, we ask whether managerial bonuses could also
have adverse eﬀects on subordinates, i.e., individuals not aﬀected directly by the bonuses.
In particular, we investigate how managerial bonuses aﬀect the subordinates’ willingness to
obey orders and whether they increase the likelihood they are coerced by their managers.
The reason we focus on coercion is because organizations typically bestow the power to
coerce upon managers. Although coercion is considered essential for the eﬃcient operation
of organizations (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Day, 1963), managers can abuse it for their private
benefit (e.g., Vafaï, 2002; Wertheimer, 1987).
While empirical evidence on bonuses exists (e.g., Prendergast, 1999), obtaining data on
how managers (mis)treat their subordinates is much harder. Coercion tends to be covert as
it is socially shunned and diﬃcult to identify (Wertheimer, 2008). This may explain partly
why despite the public attention on large managerial bonuses and the close link between
managers’ and subordinates’ performance, the potentially adverse eﬀects of managerial
bonuses on subordinates have been largely unexplored. To overcome this problem we
use a laboratory experiment to address our research question. Although the laboratory
1 In the case of top managers, bonuses can exceed the fixed salary. In January 1999, British newspa-
per The Guardian launched a website and started posting regularly information regarding large man-
agerial bonuses and salaries. To date, the site counts more more than 3,500 newspaper articles.
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/executive-pay-bonuses?)
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environment undoubtedly diﬀers from that in the field, it has the advantage that it allows
one to examine situations where it is easier to establish what constitutes fair treatment of
a worker, what constitutes coercion and exploitation, and to manipulate the environment
in a controlled way to determine conditions that may aﬀect employees adversely.2
The basic set up in our experiment is as follows. A manager is placed in charge of
a project. He must complete the project together with a subordinate. It is common
knowledge that the two workers are equally eﬃcient at project-related work, i.e., the more
eﬀort the subordinate exerts on the project, the less eﬀort the manager needs to exert.
The manager makes a suggestion about how much eﬀort the subordinate should exert.
The subordinate is not bound by this suggestion and can disobey the manager by choosing
to exert a diﬀerent level of eﬀort. The manager observes the subordinate’s eﬀort and has
the power to punish her at a personal cost. The two parties interact repeatedly for a finite
number of periods. As we explain in section 3, our set up is chosen such that it allows us
to easily determine if managers abuse the power to coerce.
To evaluate the impact of managerial bonuses, we compare behavior in three experi-
mental treatments. In the first, our Control treatment, there are no bonuses for managers.
The set up is exactly as described above. This treatment provides us with a benchmark for
evaluating the incentive eﬀects of bonuses. We examine two diﬀerent bonuses. The first
type of bonus is a standard performance bonus. In the Individual Bonus (IB) treatment,
several managers compete for two very large bonuses. The bonuses, which diﬀer in size,
are awarded to the two managers with the highest profits at the end of the experiment. As
is typical with bonuses, their recipients get to keep them for themselves.
The second type of bonus — to the best of our knowledge — is new in the incentives
literature. The aim is to examine whether a diﬀerent kind of bonus can alleviate any tension
generated between managers and subordinates. In the Pooled Bonus (PB) treatment,
instead of individual bonuses, the two managers with the highest profits at the end of the
experiment are each awarded a very large bonus pool (of the same size as the individual
bonuses in the IB treatment). Along with the bonus, they are given discretionary power
of how to allocate it: they can keep it all for themselves or share part of it with their
2For similar reasons, laboratory experiments have been previously used to study other issues in orga-
nizational economics such as the gift-exchange relationships between employers and employees (e.g. Fehr
et al., 1993), the adverse eﬀects of monitoring workers (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), factors that may
facilitate coordination within firms (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006), delegation of authority
(Hamman et al., 2010) and the impact of group membership (Goette et al., 2012).
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subordinates. Sharing the bonus is voluntarily and no explicit promises can be made.3
Apart from the ability to share the bonus at the end of the experiment, the PB and IB
treatment are identical.
Our findings confirm the intuition that managerial bonuses can have adverse eﬀects for
subordinates. Managers are nearly twice as likely to coerce subordinates when competing
for individual bonuses, than they are in the Control treatment without any bonuses. This is
despite the fact that coercion does not pay oﬀ in monetary terms. The diﬀerence is largely
driven by the increased unwillingness of subordinates to heed managers’ suggestions. The
result is that the earnings of subordinates in the IB treatment are lower than in the Control.
Pooled bonuses perform at least as well as individual bonuses in our experiment, and
in some cases they perform better. In particular, we observe that although managers make
far greater demands from their subordinates than in any of the other treatments, the level
of coercion is not higher than in the Control treatment. This is because most subordinates
tend to obey their managers (high) demands. Remarkably, although subordinates exert
much higher eﬀort levels, they are not worse oﬀ in monetary terms than in the Control
treatment as managers are willing to share a substantial fraction of their bonus with hard-
working subordinates. Managers earn significantly more than in the Control treatment and,
although they share a large part of the bonus, they do not earn less than with individual
bonuses. Therefore, in contrast to individual bonuses, pooled bonuses are found to make
both managers and their subordinates better oﬀ relative to the Control treatment. This
indicates that managerial pooled bonuses may alleviate some of the adverse eﬀects of
managerial bonuses without this being at the expense of managers.
Although we consider relative performance bonuses, we see no apparent reason why our
findings may not carry over to situations where bonuses are awarded based on absolute
target levels. We discuss this and other extensions of our work in the concluding section.
In the next section, we oﬀer a review of the related theoretical and experimental literature.
In section 3, we present our experimental design in detail, along with a theoretical investi-
gation of our game using the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion. We show
that this model is capable to account for most of our findings. Section 4 summarizes our
experimental results.
3 It is a common practice in firms across a variety of industries to specify an overall bonus amount for
groups of managers — a bonus pool (Ederhof et al., 2011), but not how it will be divided between managers.
For example, Murphy and Oyer (2001) find that 70% of the firms they surveyed used discretion in allocating
bonus pools across managers. In our set up, we allow for the bonus pool to be divided by a manager with
his team/subordinate.
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2 Related literature
One of the main insights from our experiment is the potential managerial bonuses have
to aﬀect negatively the welfare of their subordinates without making managers necessarily
better oﬀ. Previous studies have already shown that competition for large rewards can have
adverse eﬀects. Lazear (1989) was the first to indicate that as the incentives for competitors
become steeper their incentive to engage in sabotage raises as it undermines the relative
position of their opponents. Several empirical studies have validated this prediction (e.g.,
Balafoutas et al., 2012; del Corral et al., 2010; Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005). Drago
and Turnbull (1991), similarly, demonstrated that co-workers competing for promotion
will be less willing to cooperate with each other. This prediction has also found support
in empirical studies both in the lab and in the field (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 2010; Drago
and Garvey, 1998; Drago and Turnbull, 1991; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008). Our study
contributes to this literature by showing that competition for large rewards can aﬀect
adversely not only other competitors, but also third parties — the managers’ subordinates
— who are not directly involved in the competition.
Bandiera et al. (2007, 2009) were the first to provide evidence from a field experi-
ment showing that managerial incentives may aﬀect the welfare of workers. The authors
studied how the introduction of bonuses for managers in a fruit-picking farm impacts on
the allocation of workers to diﬀerent tasks (Bandiera et al., 2007), and favoritism towards
workers (Bandiera et al., 2009). Similar to our experiment, workers were employed for
a fixed term, while bonuses depended on the performance of a manager’s subordinates.
Bandiera et al. (2009) found that bonuses reduced favoritism towards workers with whom
managers are socially connected, but are not necessarily the most productive at work.
Bandiera et al. (2007) found that the introduction of managerial bonuses increased both
the mean and dispersion of subordinates’ productivity as managers targeted their eﬀorts
towards high-ability workers, while the least able workers were less likely to be selected
into employment. An important diﬀerence between the set up studied by Bandiera et al.
and ours is that in their experiments there was an excess supply of subordinates. This im-
plies that excluding low-performing workers may improve not only firm productivity, but
also equity, i.e., although some low-performing workers are excluded, this benefits high-
performing workers. As there is no excess supply of subordinates in our experiment, we
are able to show clearly that managerial bonuses have the potential to aﬀect subordinates
adversely, as managers are prepared to coerce subordinates to increase their chances of
4
obtaining one of the bonuses.4
There is a rich literature on coercion which however is mostly philosophical (e.g.,
Wertheimer, 1987; Wertheimer, 2008). Empirical data on coercion in the workplace is
(unsurprisingly) rare, at a high level of aggregation, and plagued with measurement prob-
lems. Two studies have recently tried to fill this gap by investigating coercion in laboratory
experiments. Nikiforakis et al. (2014) is the one most closely related to the present study
as it uses the same basic set up to study the relationship between information and coer-
cion/exploitation. In that study, we found managers tried repeatedly to use their power
to exploit subordinates, but these attempts were successful only under incomplete infor-
mation regarding how subordinates’ eﬀort impacts on managers’ earnings. In the other
study, Bolle et al. (2011) use a finitely-repeated game with complete information where
a principal can use his punishment power to extort resources from an agent. Similar to
Nikiforakis et al. (2014) these authors find little evidence of coercion being successful under
complete information. We are not aware of any studies associating performance incentives
such as bonuses with coercion in manager-subordinate relations.
The other important insight from our study is that pooled bonuses, i.e., rewarding man-
agers by giving them discretionary power over a bonus pool, can lead to better outcomes
than giving them individual bonuses. Since managers and subordinates interact for a finite
number of times and the bonus is paid only once at the end of the experiment, pooled
bonuses should not work better than individual bonuses. That is, unless managers care for
fairness and subordinates trust managers. Several authors have studied the impact fair-
ness concerns can have on contract design (e.g., Bartling and von Siemens, 2010; Bartling,
2011; Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004; Rey-Biel, 2008). The studies most
closely related to ours are Fehr and Schmidt (2007), and Fehr et al. (2007). Using lab
experiments they show that contracts that rely on fairness and trust can be more eﬃcient
and profitable than explicit contracts asking workers to exert a certain level of eﬀort in
exchange for a pre-specified payment. Our focus is diﬀerent. We do not consider explicit
contracts, but compare instead diﬀerent kinds of bonuses. We also endow managers with
the power to coerce subordinates — a common feature in manager-subordinate relation-
ships.5 Similar to these studies, we find that contracts that rely on fairness perform well,
4There are other important diﬀerences. For example, bonuses in Bandiera et al. (2007, 2009) are paid
on a daily basis and not only once as in our experiment. Further, managers’ and subordinates’ eﬀort are
complements (Bandiera et al., 2007, p. 730), and not substitutes.
5There are several other distinguishing features to our experiment. First, managers and subordinates
interact repeatedly although the bonus is paid only once. This alleviates strategic concerns for sharing the
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despite the fact that pooled bonuses require considerable levels of trust on behalf of the
subordinates, as we will see next.
3 The experiment
We first present in detail the basic game used in the experiment and proceed to discuss the
diﬀerent experimental treatments. After a brief discussion of the experimental procedures,
we oﬀer a theoretical analysis of the impact of managerial bonuses in our game, and a set
of behavioral hypotheses to guide the data analysis.
3.1 The game
We use a two-player, three-stage game. In stage one, the manager () makes a non—binding
suggestion, , regarding the eﬀort level that he would like his subordinate () to choose in
stage 2. In stage two, the subordinate is informed about the level of eﬀort suggested by
the manager. Since the suggestion is non—binding, the subordinate may choose any eﬀort
level  ∈ {0 1  10}. The earnings of the manager are an increasing function of  while
the earnings of the subordinate are a decreasing function of . Table 1 shows the earnings
of both players at the end of stage 2, ˆ  ∈ {} as a function of the subordinate’s
eﬀort.
Table 1: Players’ earnings as a function of eﬀort chosen by the Subordinate
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ˆ 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
ˆ 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4
In stage three, the manager learns about the level of eﬀort chosen by the subordinate
and can assign “punishment” points  ∈ N to reduce the subordinate’s earnings.6 Assigning
points is costly for the manager who must sacrifice 0.2 units for every 1 unit he wishes to
bonus, but maintains the realistic aspect that manager-subordinate relationships tend to involve repeated
interactions at least over a certain period. We also consider bonuses which are very large, in keeping with
our interest in managerial bonuses.
6Neutral language was used throughout the experiment. There was no reference to “punishment”, while
manager and subordinate were referred to as “Player A” and “Player B” respectively.
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reduce the subordinate’s earnings, i.e., we employ a 1:5 fee-to-fine ratio.7 The manager
cannot reduce the subordinate’s earnings below 0, i.e.,  ≤ ˆ . Thus, the earnings of both
players at the end of a stage three are given by
 = 12 + 2− 02 (1)
 = 24− 2−  (2)
Note that, without punishment, the game is a constant-sum game and eﬃciency con-
cerns play no role. This was done to control for subjects’ concerns for eﬃciency and simplify
the analysis of the data. Note also that an eﬀort level of 3 equates the earnings of managers
and subordinates. Given the saliency of equality in previous laboratory experiments and
the fact that players are randomly assigned their roles in the experiment,  = 3 could be
regarded as the “fair level of eﬀort.” In line with Wertheimer’s (1996, 2008) definition we
will say that a manager coerces their subordinate if the latter disobeys the manager by
choosing a lower level of eﬀort than what was suggested by the manager (i.e.,   ) and
the manager punishes her.8
3.2 Experimental treatments
There were three treatments in the experiment reported here. In all of them, participants
play the constituent game over 10 periods with the same partner. After each period, players
are informed of their own earnings and how they were determined (i.e., ,  but also ).
The final payoﬀ was the sum of payoﬀs from all 10 periods. The use of a fixed-matching
protocol makes it possible for the manager to “invest” profitably in punishment in early
periods in order to obtain the desired eﬀort level.
In treatment Control (C) subjects simply played 10 times the game described in the
preceding section. In treatment Individual Bonus (IB) all subjects were told that, in
addition to the sum of payoﬀs from all periods, managers could win one of two large
bonuses. In particular, there were 10 managers in each session. Among them, the manager
7The fee-to-fine ratio was chosen so that punishment poses a non-negligable threat to the subordinate.
In most experiments, the fee-to-fine ratio tends to be 1:3 (see e.g., Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008).
8This definition is consistent with that of Wertheimer (1996, p. 26) who states: “In general, A coerces
B to do X only if A proposes (threatens) to make B worse oﬀ with reference to some baseline condition if
B chooses not to do X, although specifying the appropriate baseline against which to measure the proposal
can be a complicated matter.” We take the suggestion of the manager as the baseline.
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with the highest total payoﬀ at the end of the experiment would receive a bonus of 900
EMU. The manager with the second highest payoﬀ in a given session would receive 720
EMU.9 Managers were privately informed whether they won one of the bonuses at the very
end of the experiment. The subordinates had no opportunity to win a bonus but were
aware of the bonus for managers.
As with managerial bonuses, these bonuses are substantial by all experimental stan-
dards. If a manager obtained the fair level of eﬀort ( = 3) from the subordinate in each
period — a plausible benchmark as we will see in section 4 — and refrained from punishing,
he would be making 180 EMU. Also, the exchange rate used between EMU and Australian
Dollar was 9 EMU = 1 AUD. Therefore, the two bonuses corresponded to 100 and 80
AUD.10 At the time of the experiment, the minimum hourly wage in Australia was 14.31
AUD. Thus, the highest bonus is nearly 7 times higher than the minimum hourly wage,
and 5 times higher than the earnings associated with the fair level of eﬀort. The second
highest bonus is about 5.5 times higher than the minimum hourly wage, and 4 times higher
than the earnings associated with the fair level of eﬀort.
Treatment Pooled Bonus (PB) was the same as treatment IB except that managers had
the option of sharing their bonus with their subordinates. To obtain a suﬃcient number
of observations, at the end of the 10 periods, before being informed about who won the
prize, every manager had to indicate the percentage of the bonus that they would share
with their subordinate in case they won a bonus (ranging from 0 to 100%). At the end of
the experiment, both subjects of a manager-subordinate team were informed whether the
manager in their team won a bonus and the percentage they shared.
3.3 Experimental procedures
Participants were invited from a database of approximately 2500 registered volunteer
students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was conducted in the Experi-
mental Economics Laboratory at the University of Melbourne, using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). For each of the three treatments, we have 20 independent observations of manager-
subordinate teams. In total 120 subjects participated in this experiment. On average,
9 In case two or more managers tied for one of the bonuses, there was a random draw to determine who
would receive the bonus. If two managers tied for the prize of 900 EMU, one was randomly selected to
receive 900 EMU and the other received 720 EMU. If two managers tied for the prize of 720 EMU, one
was randomly selected to receive 720 EMU and the other did not receive a bonus.
10At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate between the Australian and the US Dollar was
approximately 1.
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subjects took less than an hour to complete the 10 periods.11 Average earnings from the
experiment amounted to approximately 40 AUD (or 22.85 AUD per hour).
Prior to entering the laboratory, each participant drew randomly a number from a
hat. The number determined the participants’ seat in the laboratory, their role in the
experiment and their partner — the identity of whom was not revealed at any time before
or after the experiment. Participants were then asked to read the instructions. After
reading the instructions, subjects had to answer a series of test questions.
To minimize possible experimenter-demand eﬀects, we used a double-blind protocol.
A participant was randomly assigned the role of the “monitor” based on the hat draw.
The job of the monitor was to pay the participants at the end of the experiment. The
experimenter was not present during the payment. The monitor only read a general set
of instructions which was also given to the other participants who were informed that the
monitor would not read the game-specific instructions. Monitors were thus completely
unaware about the nature of the game and could not infer participants’ actions from their
earnings. Monitors received a fixed payment of 30 AUD for assistance.
3.4 Behavioral hypotheses
We solve the repeated game by backward induction for two diﬀerent behavioral assump-
tions. Assume first that it is common knowledge that players are only interested in their
own material payoﬀs. Managers will never share their bonus in treatment Pooled Bonus.
At the third stage, since punishment is costly for the manager, it will never be used (i.e.,
 = 0). Hence, at the second stage, the subordinate will choose the minimal eﬀort of  = 0.
In the first stage, the manager may make any suggestion regarding the desired eﬀort level
since this is only cheap talk. The resulting earnings per period are  = 12 and  = 24
Since this is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the constituent game, a
well-known result (see Oechssler, 2013) implies that the 10-period game has a unique SPE
and consists of playing the unique SPE of the constituent game in every period. Thus, the
theoretical prediction in this case is the same for all treatments.
As mentioned in the previous section, concerns for inequality can play an important
role in organizations. The theoretical predictions for the three treatments diﬀer markedly if
11After the 10 periods were completed, there were two further tasks which (along with the data for the
Control treatment) are partly reported in Nikiforakis et al. (2014). These included 10 more rounds of the
constituent game with reversed roles and a social values survey. The entire sessions lasted approximately
one hour forty-five minutes.
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players dislike suﬃciently inequality in earnings. To show this, let us assume Fehr-Schmidt
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and that players care only about the other player in
their (fixed) match and not about other subjects in their session.12 This model is a natural
choice for our purposes as it assumes that players may dislike being treated unfairly, but
also because it was able to account for many of the findings in Nikiforakis et al. (2014)
who used a similar game.
As pointed out by Oechssler (2013), when a constituent game is repeated a finite number
of times with Fehr and Schmidt preferences, one can in general not rely on the above result
since preferences are interdependent across periods. This is why instead of the period
earnings, ,  ∈ {} we have to use the sum of (expected) payoﬀs Π.13 The utility of
player  is then given by
 = Π − max [Π −Π 0]− max [Π −Π  0]  (3)
with 0 ≤   1 and  ≤ .
We start by deriving the equilibrium eﬀort levels in the Control treatment. For in-
equality aversion to matter, it needs to be suﬃciently strong. In particular, we need to
assume that managers care suﬃciently strongly about disadvantageous inequality so that
they will use punishment to reduce inequality whenever Π  Π . Thus, in the following
we shall assume that   14 and that this is commonly known.
Proposition 1 In treatment Control, all subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) with inequality
aversion imply that average eﬀort level ∗ :=P 10 = 3
Proof We solve the repeated game by backward induction. Consider the last stage of
the last period. Note that there will be no punishment if payoﬀs are (weakly) in favor of
the manager and  ≥ 0 because punishment would only increase the payoﬀ diﬀerence
between the manager and the subordinate. Consider now the case when the manager’s
payoﬀ is lower than that of the subordinate. Given that 5 units of punishment reduce
Π by 5 and Π by 1, the payoﬀ diﬀerence is being reduced by 4. Hence, if   14
the manager will use punishment to reduce as much as possible the inequality in material
12This seems a plausible assumption given that subjects have no information about eﬀort and punishment,
and thus individual earnings in other groups.
13By using expected payoﬀs, we implicitly employ a notion of fairness that corresponds to procedural
fairness (Saito, 2013). Experimental data seem to favor this notion over an outcome based extension of
Fehr-Schmidt preferences (Trautmann, 2009).
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payoﬀs. Assuming the subordinate knows this, her best response at stage 2 is to choose
an  such that payoﬀs are as equal as possible. Intuitively, it is better for the subordinate
to equalize payoﬀs herself rather than wait for the manager to equalize payoﬀs through
punishment.14 In particular, if earnings so far have been equal, the subordinate will choose
 = 3 in the last period.
Given this behavior, one can check that there is a unique set of subgame-perfect equi-
libria which has the properties that (i) punishment is not used on the equilibrium path and
(ii) both players receive the same payoﬀ on the equilibrium path. The resulting earnings
in the constituent game are  = 18 and  = 18 One of those equilibrium paths is focal
as it involves a constant eﬀort of  = 3 in each period, but there are also SPE in which, for
example, the subordinate chooses  = 2 in one period and makes up for this with  = 4 in
another period. However, the average eﬀort over all 10 periods must be 3. ¤
Let us now consider the impact of bonuses on equilibrium eﬀort levels. Recall that if
two or more managers tie for a bonus, the bonus is allocated randomly. Let ˆ denote the
expected bonus. Payoﬀs including the bonus (but before sharing) are thus Π =P +ˆ
and Π =P  .
Proposition 2 In treatment Individual Bonus, all SPE with inequality aversion imply that
average eﬀort levels ∗ are such that 0 ≤ ∗ ≤ 3
Proof Suppose there were a SPE in which a subordinate chose an average eﬀort of ∗  3.
By deviating to ∗ = 3, the subordinate would increase Π and simultaneously reduce
inequality in earnings without receiving any punishment as the manager would still earn
weakly more than the subordinate. Thus, an average eﬀort of ∗  3 cannot be part of a
SPE. ¤
In contrast to treatment Control, in treatment IB, a SPE with ∗ = 0 for all subordi-
nates is possible for all parameter values. If all subordinates choose the same eﬀort, the
chance of winning one of the bonuses is 110. In this case, ˆ = 110(900 + 720) = 162
Thus, for ∗ = 0 we have that Π = 12 × 10 + 162 = 282 while Π = 24 × 10 = 240.
Since Π  Π  there will be no punishment for all  . Deviation to higher eﬀorts is
unprofitable as it would reduce Π and simultaneously increase inequality. Thus, ∗ = 0
for all subordinates is a SPE.
14 If the subordinate is suﬃciently concerned about inequality in her favor (  12), she would choose
an eﬀort to equalize payoﬀs without the threat of punishment (i.e. even if   14).
11
Propositions (1) and (2) imply a counter-intuitive eﬀect for individual managerial
bonuses. In particular, they suggest that the introduction of such bonuses will not in-
crease eﬀort levels; in fact, it may lower them. The intuition is that bonuses benefit only
managers; to reduce the resulting inequality in earnings, subordinates exert low eﬀort
levels.
Finally, we consider equilibrium eﬀort levels when managers compete for pooled bonuses.
The key feature of pooled bonuses is that fair-minded managers can share them with their
subordinates and eliminate any ex post inequalities in earnings between them. The follow-
ing proposition shows that even strongly inequality averse subordinates may be willing to
exert maximal eﬀort levels to help their managers obtain a pooled bonus.
Proposition 3 The following SPE exist in treatment Pooled Bonus.
(1) If   12 managers will not share the bonus. Thus, the SPE are the same as
in Proposition 2.
(2) If  ≥ 12 managers will share the bonus. All SPE with inequality aversion are
of the form that   5 subordinates exert  = 10 and 10 −  exert an average eﬀort of
∗ = 3
Proof (1) If   12, sharing the bonus lowers the manager’s utility (3). Thus, ex
post managers have no incentive to share their bonus. Anticipating this, subordinates will
behave as in treatment IB (see Proposition 2).
(2) If  ≥ 12, sharing the bonus up to the point where payoﬀs are equal increases
the manager’s utility (3). Thus managers will make a voluntary transfer of
min{max{0 (Π −Π)2} ˆ}
For a given SPE, let ¯ and  be the highest and lowest average eﬀort of the 10 teams
in a session. Let us suppose that ¯  10 The ex post payoﬀ (after sharing) for the
subordinate whose manager currently has the lowest probability of receiving the high bonus
(which must be less than 110) is at most 24 × 10 + (900 + 720)10 = 402. This maximal
payoﬀ would arise when all subordinates chose ∗ = 0 and all subordinates nevertheless
received the entire bonus from their managers. A deviation to   ¯ by this subordinate
will assure the high bonus of 900 with certainty. This yields ex post payoﬀs (after sharing)
of (36 × 10 + 900)2 = 630 for the subordinate and thus a profitable deviation. Thus,
¯ = 10 in any SPE.
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Suppose next that exactly one subordinate chooses  = 10 Hence, her manager will
receive the high bonus. The maximal payoﬀ of a subordinate whose manager currently has
the lowest probability of receiving the other bonus, is 24× 10 + 7209 = 320. A deviation
by this agent to  = 10 by will ensure an expected bonus of (900 + 720)2 = 810. This
yields ex post payoﬀs (after sharing) of (36× 10+ 810)2 = 585 for the subordinate and is
thus a profitable deviation. Thus, at least  ≥ 2 subordinates choose  = 10 in any SPE.
Suppose next that any subordinate chooses an average eﬀort ∗  3. Given that   2
other subordinates choose  = 10, the manager of this subordinate will not receive a bonus.
Hence, his payoﬀ is lower than that of his subordinate and he would punish her until payoﬀs
are equalized. Thus, there is no SPE in which a subordinate will choose an eﬀort ∗  3.
Consider any ∗ with 3  ∗  10. Given that there is no bonus, a subordinate will be
better oﬀ choosing ∗ = 3 since she is not punished and obtains Π = 180. Thus  = 3 and
no average eﬀort levels 3  ∗  10 are chosen in a SPE
Finally, suppose that 2   ≤ 5. For  ≤ 5 the expected bonus is at least ˆ ≥
(900 + 720)5 = 324 Thus any subordinate of a manager who does not receive a bonus
could deviate to  = 10. This deviation from ∗ = 3 would be profitable as it guarantees a
payoﬀ of at least (4 × 10 + 32 × 10 + 324)2 = 342  180 for both the subordinate and
her manager. ¤
For   5 the expected bonus is not large enough to equalize the payoﬀ of the manager
and the subordinate. Thus, there exist   0 such that the utility (3) of the subordinate
is lower than 180, i.e., the utility resulting from choosing ∗ = 3. Thus, SPE with   5
exist only for suﬃciently small .
Based on the three propositions above, we oﬀer the following behavioral hypotheses as
a guide for our data analysis.
Hypothesis 1 (Control): Average eﬀort levels will be equal to 3 — the fair level of eﬀort,
which equalizes the pre-punishment earnings of managers and their subordinates.
Hypothesis 2 (Individual bonuses): The introduction of individual bonuses for man-
agers will not increase average eﬀort levels relative to the Control treatment, and may even
decrease them.
Hypothesis 3 (Pooled bonuses): The introduction of pooled bonuses for managers will
lead to higher average eﬀort levels relative to the Control treatment.
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4 Results
4.1 Managerial bonuses and subordinates’ eﬀort
Figure 1 shows the average eﬀort levels across periods for the diﬀerent treatments. It is
easy to see that the hypotheses obtained using the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model are nicely
borne out in our data. First, in line with Hypothesis 1, average eﬀort levels in the Control
treatment (C) appear to be very close to the fair level of eﬀort ( = 3). Second, in line
with Hypothesis 2, average eﬀort levels in treatment Individual Bonus (IB) are slightly
lower than those in treatment C, whereas in line with Hypothesis 3, those in Pooled Bonus
(PB) are almost twice as high than those in C. Across all periods, average eﬀorts are 2.71
in IB, 3.03 in C, and 5.80 in PB. Average eﬀort in C and IB is significantly lower than in
PB according to MWU-tests (  01).15 Average eﬀort in C and IB is not significantly
diﬀerent from each other (MWU-test,  = 70) nor is it diﬀerent from the ‘fair’ eﬀort level
of 3 (Wilcoxon-test,   32).
Figure 2 shows a histogram of the relative frequencies of eﬀort choices for the three
treatments. As predicted by the theory in the previous section, eﬀort choices in treatments
C and IB are concentrated on and around  = 3 In contrast, in line with Proposition 3,
eﬀort choices in treatment PB are concentrated on  = 10 and, to a lesser extent, on  = 0
and  = 3.
Result 1 Eﬀort is substantially and significantly higher with pooled bonuses. In the Indi-
vidual Bonus treatment, eﬀort is similar to that in the Control treatment and not signifi-
cantly diﬀerent from the fair eﬀort level.
The fact that average eﬀort levels are in line with our behavioral hypotheses provides
indirect support for the assumption that some participants are concerned about inequalities
in earnings. Next we investigate how the diﬀerent types of bonuses aﬀected managers’
suggestions and the reaction of their subordinates.
4.2 Managerial demands and subordinates’ disobedience
Figure 3 shows the average suggestions across periods for the diﬀerent treatments. Note
first that suggestions are significantly higher than the ‘fair’ eﬀort level of 3 in all treatments
15All non-parametric tests reported in this paper take averages from each team as one observation and
use two-sided test statistics.
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Figure 1: Average eﬀort across periods (“Fair” eﬀort level of 3 shown for comparision).
(Wilcoxon-test,   01). Across all periods, average suggestions are 4.66 in C, 5.14 in
IB, and 7.49 in PB. Average suggestions in C and IB are significantly lower than in PB
(MWU-test,   01), but not significantly diﬀerent from each other (MWU-test,  = 24).
Interestingly, in the first period, suggestions in IB are significantly higher than in C (MWU-
test,  = 02). However, thereafter they appear to decline over time. Random-eﬀects
regressions (see Table 8 in the online appendix) show the decline is statistically significant
in both IB and PB (  01), but not in C.
Result 2 Managers’ suggestions exceed the fair eﬀort level in all treatments, but managers
are far more demanding throughout the experiment when they can earn pooled bonuses.
With individual bonuses, managers’ suggestions are initially higher than in the Control
treatment, but decline over time.
Next we turn our attention to how subordinates react to the suggestions by their man-
agers. We measure disobedience by the diﬀerence between the manager’s suggestion and
subordinate’s eﬀort (i.e.  − ). Figure 4 shows the frequency of disobedience for the
diﬀerent treatments, i.e., how often eﬀort is lower than what was suggested. Although as
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Figure 2: Relative frequencies of eﬀort choices
seen in Figure 3 above, managers seem to anticipate disobedience in IB and ask for less
than in PB, still there is significantly more disobedience in IB relative to C (MWU-tests,
 = 026) and PB ( = 048). This indicates that individual bonuses for managers create
tension with their subordinates. Disobedience is not significantly diﬀerent in PB relative
to C ( = 93), which suggests that the opportunity to share pooled bonuses alleviates
fully the tension caused by the bonuses. Random-eﬀects regressions (see Table 9 in the
online appendix) show that disobedience declines over time in both IB (  01) and PB
(  05), but not in C.
Result 3 There is more disobedience with individual bonuses relative to pooled bonuses and
no bonuses. The frequency of disobedience in Pooled Bonus and Control is not significantly
diﬀerent.
4.3 Managerial bonuses and coercion
Managers can address disobedience either by coercion (i.e., by punishing disobedient sub-
ordinates) or by reducing demands in future periods. Disobedience in our experiment is
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Figure 3: Average suggestions across periods
the main reason for reducing a subordinate’s income in the third stage: in 98.2% of the
cases punishment is meted out it is in response to subordinates’ disobedience. That is,
income reduction, punishment and coercion are all synonymous in our experiment.
Figure 5 shows the frequency of punishment across periods. Across all periods, the
relative frequency of punishment in IB is 52.5% — almost twice as high as in the other two
treatments (28% in both cases).16 The frequency of punishment in C and IB is significantly
lower than in PB (Fisher’s exact test,   01) and not significantly diﬀerent from each
other (Fisher’s exact test,  = 1). The average number of punishment points in IB is 4.82,
which is significantly higher than that in C at 2.49 points (MWU-test,  = 029). Average
punishment in PB is at the intermediate level of 3.62, which is not significantly diﬀerent
from the other two treatments (MWU-test,   9). Given the lower frequency of coercion
in PB, this suggests that if managers decide to punish in PB, they punish more harshly
than in the other treatments.
To better distinguish between the frequency and severity of punishment, the appropriate
16There seems to be a time trend in the propensity to punish in treatment IB. However, once we control
for eﬀort levels and disobedience we find that it is not significant (see Table 10 in the online appendix).
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Figure 4: Relative frequencies of disobedience (i.e. instances in which   )
specification for a regression is a hurdle-model (Nikiforakis, 2008). The hurdle-model is a
parametric generalization of the Tobit model in which the decision to punish and the level
of punishment are determined by two separate stochastic processes. The hurdle is crossed
if an individual decides to punish. The likelihood function for the hurdle model is given
by the product of two separate likelihoods. First, the likelihood that a subject will punish,
which is captured by a standard Probit model, and second, the conditional likelihood of an
individual assigning a certain number of punishment points, which is estimated by using
a truncated linear regression. The two parts of the hurdle-model are estimated separately
(McDowell, 2003).
Table 2 shows the results for the hurdle model for three diﬀerent specifications. The
probit regression of model (1) shows that subordinates are almost 30 percentage points more
likely to be punished in IB relative to C, a large diﬀerence, confirming the impression from
Figure 5. This is remarkable given that managers in IB noticeably reduce their demands
over time (see Figure 3), and highlights the tension between managers and subordinates
caused by individual bonuses. Managers in PB are as likely to coerce subordinates as in C.
However, the linear random eﬀect regression for   0 (Severity) shows that if managers
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Table 2: What determines punishment? A hurdle model
(1) (2) (3)
Frequency Severity Frequency Severity Frequency Severity
IB
29∗∗
(12)
31
(130)
19
(13)
005
(185)
−00
(20)
20
(271)
PB
−03
(11)
402∗∗∗
(149)
−09
(11)
−154
(234)
−12
(19)
−142
(328)
(− ) 11∗∗∗
(02)
125∗∗∗
(034)
08∗∗∗
(02)
15
(34)
(− ) ∗  02
(03)
−06
(41)
01
(03)
02
(43)
(− ) ∗  −00
(03)
68
(46)
−01
(03)
83∗
(48)
 −13∗∗∗
(03)
−297∗∗∗
(052)
 ∗  07
(05)
29
(67)
 ∗  07
(04)
130∗∗
(64)
constant
880∗∗∗
(103)
459∗∗∗
(145)
1386∗∗∗
(205)
Log likelihood −3310 −2590 −2455
2 05 29 51
Note: “Frequency” reports estimates from a probit random eﬀects regression modelling the decision
whether to punish or not. Entries are average marginal eﬀects of the independent variables
(Bartus, 2005). “Severity” stands for a truncated linear random eﬀects regression modelling the
amount of point assigned if   0. IB and PB are treatment dummies. e indicates subordinate’s
eﬀort, and s indicates a manager’s suggestion. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant
at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 600 (Frequency), 217 (Severity).
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Figure 5: Relative frequencies of punishment (  0) across periods
choose to punish in PB, then punishment is more severe. Further, as seen in models (2)
and (3), all treatment diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerent levels of disobedience (−)
and diﬀerent eﬀort levels.
Result 4 Managers are nearly twice as likely to coerce subordinates when competing for
individual bonuses than they are in the Control treatment, but not when they compete for
pooled bonuses. Coercion is determined by the level of disobedience and of eﬀort. Although
more rare, disobedience is punished more severely in the presence of pooled bonuses.
Is coercion successful in raising subordinates’ eﬀort levels? Table 3 shows the results
of random eﬀects regressions with eﬀort as the dependent variable. The key independent
variables are Suggestion in , Punishment in − 1, i.e., the income reduction experienced
in the previous period, and Period  All variables are used as first diﬀerences. The results
indicate that subordinates respond strongly to the suggestions made by managers in treat-
ments C and PB. Remarkably, there is a zero eﬀect in treatment IB. Coercion is successful
at raising eﬀort levels in all treatments, but the eﬀect is fairly small. As indicated by the
coeﬃcient of Points in t-1, a manager that reduced the subordinate’s earnings by 10 points
20
Table 3: What determines eﬀort? Random eﬀects regression
dependent variable: eﬀort in  C IB PB All
Suggestion in  038∗∗∗
(006)
003
(006)
043∗∗
(017)
038∗∗∗
(007)
Points in − 1 006∗∗∗
(002)
007∗∗∗
(002)
011∗∗∗
(003)
006∗∗
(003)
Period
000
(015)
−002
(013)
015
(024)
000
(018)
Individual Bonus (IB)
−002
(026)
Pooled Bonus (PB)
015
(026)
IB * suggestion in  −035∗∗∗
(011)
PB * suggestion in  005
(014)
IB * points in − 1 000
(004)
PB * points in − 1 005
(004)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables in the regression were used as first diﬀerences.
∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 160 (C, IB, PB), 480 (pooled).
on average can expect to see an increase at the eﬀort of his subordinate of 0.6 units in C,
0.7 units in IB and 1.1 units in PB. Given this, we conclude that coercion does not pay oﬀ
in monetary terms.
Result 5 Although coercion has a positive eﬀect on eﬀort in all treatments, the increase in
eﬀort is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the cost of coercion for the manager. Managers’ suggestions
influence the eﬀort of their subordinate in the Control and Pooled Bonus treatments, but
not in Individual Bonus.
4.4 Bonus sharing and earnings
In the previous sections we saw that many subordinates in the Pooled Bonus (PB) treat-
ment are willing to follow their managers suggestions and repeatedly exert high (even
maximal) levels of eﬀort. This is a risky strategy as they will earn little money from the
experiment lest their manager repays their eﬀorts by sharing part of the bonus, if he wins
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one of the bonuses. A subordinate that willingly chooses ∗ = 10 without being coerced,
for example, has earnings of 40 EMU, which correspond to 4.40 Euros. This is considerably
lower than the 180 EMU she would earn for choosing the fair level of eﬀort ∗ = 3 if not
coerced.
Does trusting managers pay oﬀ? Let us first focus on the five of the 20 managers whose
subordinates consistently chose very high eﬀort levels (i.e., ∗  95) and are therefore the
ones most likely to obtain a bonus. These managers share on average 45% of the bonus.
In contrast, managers of subordinates who exert lower levels of eﬀort (i.e., ∗ ≤ 95) are
willing to share only 20% of the bonus.17 Figure 6 shows that the final profit of subordinates
is decreasing in eﬀort except for eﬀorts above 9.5, which yield by far the highest payoﬀ
(including shared bonuses). Consequently, it is optimal to provide full eﬀort or no eﬀort.
Note that this is not too far from the prediction of the asymmetric SPE with inequality
aversion, where   5 subordinates are supposed to exert an eﬀort of 10 and the remaining
an eﬀort of 3 (see also Figure 2).
Result 6 Subordinates exerting near maximal eﬀort throughout the experiment, on average
receive 45% of the bonus from their managers. Their earnings exceed those from any other
eﬀort level, including the ‘fair level of eﬀort’ of 3, by a large margin.
The sharing behavior of managers has interesting implications for the final payoﬀs
of subordinates. Table 4 lists the final payoﬀs of subordinates (right side columns) for
all treatments. Despite the fact that subordinates in PB exert much higher eﬀorts on
average than in the other two treatments, their final payoﬀs are not significantly lower. In
fact, average subordinates’ payoﬀs are highest in PB, although these diﬀerences are not
significant as the standard deviations of payoﬀs in PB are much higher than in the other
two treatments due to the small number of bonuses in the experiment. In contrast, final
payoﬀs in IB are (weakly) significantly lower than those in C (MWU-test,  = 068). As
eﬀorts in IB are similar to those in C, this diﬀerence must be caused by increased coercion
in IB.
Result 7 Despite the fact that subordinates exert much higher eﬀorts with pooled bonuses
than in the other two treatments, their final payoﬀs are not significantly lower. Earnings
of subordinates whose managers compete for individual bonuses are (weakly) significantly
lower than in the Control.
17For team-by-team averages of eﬀort, suggestions, punishment, and bonus sharing, see Tables 5 - 7 in
the online appendix.
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Figure 6: Subordinates’ final payoﬀ (including shared bonuses) in treatment PB depending
on their chosen eﬀort levels
Note: The payoﬀ of 180 associated with the fair eﬀort level of 3 is shown for comparison.
Table 4: Final total payoﬀs of Managers and Subordinates
treatment Managers Subordinates
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
C 175.5 23.9 154.6 26.0
IB 326.5 343.5 137.7 32.5
PB 312.8 213.9 164.8 155.9
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Table 4 also lists the final payoﬀs of managers (left side columns). What is most inter-
esting is that final payoﬀs of managers in PB (after sharing the bonus) are not significantly
lower than in IB. In fact, despite the fact that managers in PB often give away substantial
fractions of their bonus as we saw their earnings are significantly higher than in C (MWU-
test,  = 028). In contrast, although slightly greater on average, managers’ earnings in IB
are not significantly larger than in C (MWU-test,  = 063).
Result 8 Despite the fact that managers give away a substantial fraction of their bonus,
they are not worse oﬀ with pooled bonuses than they are with individual bonuses. Relative
to the Control, managers competing for pooled bonuses earn significantly more money than
managers competing for individual bonuses.
5 Concluding remarks
The first insight from our study is that managerial bonuses have the potential of generating
conflict between managers and their subordinates. Managerial bonuses can be a disincen-
tive for subordinates who dislike inequality. As managers’ performance depends on that
of their subordinates, managers may be inclined to exert pressure on them, even coerce
them. In our experiment we saw that large managerial bonuses increased considerably the
levels of subordinates’ disobedience and nearly doubled manager’s propensity to engage in
coercion. The tension between managers and subordinates persisted until the end of the
experiment with negative consequences for subordinates.
The tension between managers and their subordinates documented in our study sug-
gests firms should exercise caution when using high-powered incentives for managers. The
benefits from managers’ increased motivation (e.g., Bandiera et al., 2007, 2009) need to be
weighed carefully against the adverse eﬀects for other employees. Holmström and Milgrom
(1990) write that “it has been somewhat of a mystery to organizational observers, why
there is so much less reliance on high-powered incentives than basic agency theory would
suggest” (p. 93). Our study provides a novel explanation for this “mystery” which stands
together with the well-known arguments related to sabotage and reduced incentives for
cooperation (e.g., Lazear, 1989; Itoh, 1991).
The second main insight from our study is that firms may be able to alleviate tensions
by awarding “pooled bonuses” instead of individual bonuses to managers. The eﬃcacy
of pooled bonuses relies critically on subordinates’ willingness to trust their managers
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and the latter’s trustworthiness. In our set up, which resembles most closely fixed-term
employment contracts, managers have no strategic incentive to share bonuses. Despite this,
we found that pooled bonuses did not create tension between managers and subordinates.
Moreover, most managers did not betray their subordinates’ trust. It seems therefore
plausible that pooled bonuses will work at least as well in employment contracts of indefinite
length as managers will have incentives to maintain a good working relationship with their
subordinates.
Like with all empirical studies, more evidence will help determine the extent our find-
ings generalize to diﬀerent environments and populations. To that end, there are many
interesting ways our study can be extended. First, in our study we consider only relative-
performance bonuses. Although the tension between managers and subordinates may per-
sist when bonuses are awarded based on absolute-performance targets, the extent of the
tension may depend on the level of the targets managers have to meet. Second, similar
to Bandiera et al. (2007, 2009), we studied finitely repeated interactions as this simpli-
fies the analysis and interpretation of the data. Several work relations however are of
indefinite length. It will be interesting to explore the impact of managerial bonuses in
indefinitely repeated interactions. Do pooled bonuses continue to outperform individual
bonuses? The key feature of pooled bonuses is that they allow managers to share the
reward with high-performing subordinates, so it seems plausible our results may apply to
long-term contracts.
A third interesting question for future research is whether the tension created by man-
agerial bonuses can be alleviated if managers are willing to compensate subordinates in a
non-pecuniary form, e.g., by expressing their appreciation, writing positive reference let-
ters. Since this option will exist for all managers, pooled bonuses may still perform better
given managers’ ability to reward subordinates (also) in monetary terms, but subordinates
may exhibit less disobedience than in our experiment when managers who compete for
individual bonuses can reward them in a diﬀerent (non-pecuniary) way that may be of
value to them. Finally, it would be interesting to explore the extent to which withholding
information about bonuses from subordinates alleviates the latter’s resistance. The evi-
dence in Nikiforakis et al. (2014) suggests that subordinates disobey managers even under
asymmetric information concerning payoﬀs, as they seem to anticipate the managers’ inten-
tion to exploit their informational advantage. Whether pooled bonuses for managers will
perform better than individual bonuses in this case (or any of the other cases mentioned
above), however, is an empirical question for future research.
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Appendix 1: Additional tables (for online publication only)
Table 5: Average team eﬀort, suggestion, punishment, Treatment C
team eﬀort suggestion punishment
101 3.10 6.50 5.00
102 2.10 5.50 3.50
103 1.90 3.00 4.40
104 6.60 7.00 0.00
105 1.40 5.30 3.70
106 3.30 4.00 0.00
107 3.30 4.10 5.10
108 3.00 3.00 0.00
109 3.00 3.00 0.00
110 2.70 8.90 1.30
111 2.40 3.40 2.40
112 2.70 3.30 2.20
113 4.80 6.30 3.00
114 2.70 4.20 2.50
115 3.00 3.20 0.30
116 3.00 3.00 0.00
117 2.80 5.80 8.60
118 3.00 5.70 2.00
119 3.80 3.90 0.10
120 1.90 4.00 5.70
treatment avg. 3.03 4.66 2.49
1
Table 6: Average team eﬀort, suggestion, punishment, Treatment IB
team eﬀort suggestion punishment
401 3.40 7.00 2.50
402 1.30 6.70 2.90
403 4.00 5.40 8.70
404 0.60 6.70 8.80
405 3.90 4.20 0.50
406 2.10 3.60 8.00
407 2.40 3.80 4.40
408 3.40 7.20 6.00
409 1.70 6.70 6.90
410 2.70 4.60 3.80
411 4.90 5.70 1.00
412 1.00 3.20 14.00
413 3.00 3.00 0.00
414 3.60 5.50 4.90
415 3.00 4.20 1.50
416 2.30 2.70 0.00
417 2.60 6.40 9.50
418 3.10 4.60 3.50
419 1.60 3.50 5.10
420 3.50 8.10 4.40
treatment avg. 2.71 5.14 4.82
2
Table 7: Average team eﬀort, suggestion, punishment, percent shared, Treatment PB
team eﬀort suggestion punishment % bonus shared
501 10.00 2.80 0.00 45.00
502 2.70 4.40 2.00 0.00
503 3.10 4.80 1.50 30.00
504 10.00 10.00 0.00 65.00
505 0.40 1.00 0.00 75.00
506 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
507 8.80 9.00 0.00 50.00
508 4.40 6.80 5.90 20.00
509 5.50 9.80 8.60 25.00
510 4.40 10.00 13.60 35.00
511 4.70 9.80 7.80 20.00
512 2.20 3.70 3.50 0.00
513 9.90 9.70 0.00 50.00
514 1.70 4.60 6.50 0.00
515 9.10 9.60 1.00 0.00
516 3.50 8.10 13.60 0.00
517 2.20 5.90 7.60 30.00
518 10.00 10.00 0.00 65.00
519 9.30 10.00 0.70 0.00
520 4.10 9.70 0.00 10.00
treatment avg. 5.80 7.49 3.62 26.00
Table 8: Time trends in suggestions? Random eﬀects regressions
dependent variable: suggestion C IB PB
period
000
(004)
−12∗∗∗
(004)
−013∗∗∗
(004)
constant
464∗∗∗
(044)
579∗∗∗
(042)
818∗∗∗
(069)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 200 in all
regressions.
3
Table 9: Time trends in disobedience? Random eﬀects regressions
dependent variable: (− ) C IB PB
period
−001
(005)
−14∗∗∗
(005)
−015∗∗
(006)
constant
167∗∗∗
(045)
322∗∗∗
(050)
251∗∗∗
(074)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 200 in all
regressions.
Table 10: Time trends in punishment? Random eﬀects regressions
dependent variable: probability of punishment C IB PB
(− ) 026∗∗∗ 028∗∗∗ 020∗∗
(007) (008) (009)
 −038∗∗∗ −020 −028∗∗
(010) (011) (012)
period −002 −006 −002
(004) (004) (006)
constant −001 030 −013
(044) (055) (086)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 200 in all
regressions.
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